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Although many preferential choices in everyday life
require remembering relevant information, the inter-
play of neural systems mediating decisions and
memory has rarely been studied. We addressed
this question by combining a task, in which choice
options had to be retrieved frommemory, with cogni-
tive modeling and fMRI. We found that memory-
guided decisions are captured by established pro-
cess models of choice (sequential sampling models)
but constrained by forgetting. People are biased
toward remembered options and reject them only
if they are very unattractive. Using a Bayesian
modeling approach, we determined the posterior
probability that options were remembered given the
observed choices. This probability correlated with
hippocampal activation during encoding. During
decision making, the bias toward remembered op-
tions was linked to increased connectivity between
hippocampus and ventromedial prefrontal cortex.
Our results provide insights into the dependency of
decisions on memory constraints and show that
memory-related activation can be inferred from
decisions.
INTRODUCTION
When choosing the best restaurant for an evening dinner or pick-
ing an adequate birthday present for a friend, the available
choice options are usually not directly on hand but have to be
retrieved from memory. Typically, we ask ourselves what the
good restaurants are that we know of, or what kind of gifts
we made in the past. Thus, many value-based decisions rely
on memory processes and bear the potential to be biased
by forgetting relevant information. However, the cognitive and
neural mechanisms underlying memory-guided preferential
choices are poorly understood. Here, we investigated the inter-
play of decision making and long-term memory processes in
the brain using fMRI and a choice task that required participants
to first encode and later recall the available choice options.1078 Neuron 86, 1078–1090, May 20, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.Converging work in psychology and neuroscience provides
support for process models that describe decisions as emerging
from sequential sampling of evidence (Gold and Shadlen, 2007;
Heekeren et al., 2008; Smith and Ratcliff, 2004). In the case of
preferential choices, the difference in subjective value between
the available choice options is implemented as a decision
variable (DV), which accumulates over time until a decision
threshold is reached and a response is selected (Gluth et al.,
2012, 2013; Krajbich et al., 2010). The DV is affected by random
noise, implying that smaller value differences make choices less
predictable. Moreover, as the noise is progressively cancelled
out by sampling (Shadlen and Kiani, 2013), these models can
account for the increase of choice accuracy with decision time
(Diederich, 2003; Forstmann et al., 2008; Ratcliff and Rouder,
1998).
In principle, we predict that memory-guided preferential
choices can be accounted for by the same computational mech-
anisms and thus profit from having more time to decide. The po-
tential of forgetting information, however, should limit decision
accuracy and might also introduce a bias toward remembered
options. The first goal of this study was thus to identify the
particular challenges of decisions from memory. Thereto, we
compared the behavior of participants in an fMRI memory group
(henceforthmemory group) with the behavior of participants in a
non-fMRI control group (henceforth control group) who per-
formed the identical choice task with/without the necessity to
recall the choice options. Second, we developed a process
model of choice to unravel the cognitive mechanisms of mem-
ory-guided decision making as well as to inform the analysis of
the fMRI data. With respect to these fMRI analyses, we first
tested whether modeling choice behavior is sufficient to make
predictions about memory-related activation in the brain. In
other words: can we infer memory strength on the basis of
memory-guided decision, analogous to the well-established
subsequent memory effect (Kim, 2011; Paller and Wagner,
2002)? Second, we were interested in the neural circuitry under-
lying preferential choices from memory and how this circuitry
mediates a putative memory bias on decisions.
RESULTS
Behavioral Results
In the experimental study, n = 30 hungry participants were
introduced to 48 different food snacks and indicated their
Figure 1. Experimental Design
(A) BDM auction. Before scanning, participants
indicated the subjective value of each of the 48
snacks in a BDM auction.
(B) Memory and decision task. In each run, par-
ticipants first learned to associate snacks with
locations. Half of the snacks were encoded 23.
After a two-back working memory task, partici-
pants repeatedly decided between the snacks.
Only locations were shown (for either 1 s or 5 s
before the response could be made), and corre-
sponding snacks had to be retrieved from
memory. At the end, participants had to report the
identity of each snack and how well they remem-
bered it. fMRI datawere collected during encoding
phase, two-back task, and decision phase as
indicated by the gray background.willingness to pay money for each of the snacks in a Becker-
DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) auction (Becker et al., 1964) (Fig-
ure 1A). Similar to previous studies (e.g., Krajbich et al., 2010;
Polanı´a et al., 2014), we used the individual BDM values as a
measure of the snacks’ subjective values and to define choice
accuracy in the subsequent ‘‘memory and decision’’ task (see
below) by assuming that a choice is ‘‘correct’’ if the option
with the higher BDM value is selected. Afterward, participants
underwent fMRI while conducting the ‘‘memory and decision’’
task (Figure 1B). The task comprised multiple runs and each
run included four different phases: encoding, distraction, deci-
sions, and cued recall. During encoding, participants learned to
associate 6 different snacks with 6 different locations on the
screen. We manipulated the ability to remember the snacks
by presenting three of them only 13 and the other three 23.
After working on a two-back distractor task for 30 s to
‘‘overwrite’’ their working memory, participants repeatedlyNeuron 86, 1078–10chose between two snacks during the
decision phase, knowing that one of
their choices would be paid out at the
end of the experiment. Critically, the
snacks were not visible; instead, only lo-
cations were highlighted and partici-
pants had to recall the snacks’ identities
linked to these locations. To test a cen-
tral prediction of sequential sampling
models (SSMs), the improvement of de-
cisions with time, highlighted locations
were shown for either 1 or 5 s before
the response had to be given. After the
decision phase, the MR scanner was
turned off and participants were asked
to recall the snacks. A control group
(n = 30) that did not undergo fMRI con-
ducted the same task, but with snacks
being visible during the decision phase.
With respect to behavior, we first
investigated the cued recall performance
of the memory group. Figure 2A shows
that participants rememberedmore itemsshown 23 than shown only 13 (t(29) = 6.78, p < 0.001), suggest-
ing that we successfully manipulated memory strength. Impor-
tantly, in contrast to previous research that investigated the
impact of reward on long-term memory formation (Adcock
et al., 2006; Cohen et al., 2014; Wittmann et al., 2005), we
focused on the influence of memory on reward-based decision
making. Therefore, we ensured that the value of an item did
not affect participants’ ability to remember it (see Experimental
Procedures). Indeed, a linear regression analysis for each partic-
ipant with recall performance as a dependent variable and BDM
value as a predictor was not significant (t(29) = 1.40, p = 0.171).
Likewise, a regression analysis with ‘‘absolute’’ BDM value
(i.e., a snack’s value difference from the individual mean BDM
value) was not significant (t(29) = 1.76, p = 0.089). Consistently,
when splitting the offered snacks into six categories of BDM
values (from lowest to highest), the memory performance was
comparable across all categories (all pairwise comparisons90, May 20, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 1079
Figure 2. Behavioral Results
(A and B) Cued recall performance in the memory group was higher for items encoded 23 and independent of the value of the recalled item.
(C) Choice accuracy in the memory group was lower than in the control group; both groups benefited from longer decision time; only the memory group profited
from encoding snacks 23.
(D) The memory group preferred snacks shown 23 over snacks shown 13.
(E) Choice accuracy in the memory group, depending on whether both, one, or none of the snacks were recalled.
(F) Participants were more accurate if the snack with the higher value (‘‘better’’) was recalled compared to if the ‘‘worse’’ snack was recalled.
(G) Probability of choosing the remembered snack (over the forgotten snack) depending on its z-transformed BDM value; black line, frequency of selecting the
remembered snack; gray line, average fit of a logistic function (see Equation 1); participants’ preferenceswere shifted toward remembered snacks. Error bars and
dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. See also Figure S1.p > 0.1; ANOVA with factor BDM value category: F(5,25) = 0.43,
p = 0.825) (Figure 2B).
Next, we examined the choice behavior during the decision
phase. To test whether and how the manipulations of memory
strength and decision time affected decision making, we
analyzed choice accuracy in a 23 23 2 mixed ANOVA with en-
coding type (both snacks shown 13 versus 23) and decision
time (1 s versus 5 s) as within-subject factors and group (memory1080 Neuron 86, 1078–1090, May 20, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.versus control) as between-subjects factor (Figure 2C). We ob-
tained significant main effects for the factors group (F(1,58) =
18.20, p < 0.001) and decision time (F(1,58) = 58.56, p < 0.001),
indicating that the control group performed better than the
memory group and that both groups were more accurate when
having more time to decide. Furthermore, the interaction of
group 3 encoding type was significant (F(1,58) = 9.11, p =
0.004), showing that only the memory group was more accurate
when the snacks had been shown 23 (as compared to 13) dur-
ing encoding (memory group: t(29) = 3.00, p = 0.006; control
group: t(29) = 1.11, p = 0.276). Taken together, decisions become
more accurate with more time to decide (in line with SSM predic-
tions), but performance is limited by the capability to remember
the relevant information.
A central goal of this study was to test whether memory biases
choices. Thereto, we first looked at the third of decision trials,
in which one snack was shown 23 and the other only 13.
If participants are driven toward remembered snacks, they
should show a preference for snacks shown 23 (since their
memory for these snacks was better). Indeed, we found that
the 23 snack was selected more often than the 13 snack
(t(29) = 2.50, p = 0.018) (Figure 2D), even though the snacks’
BDM values were carefully matched (see Experimental Proce-
dures). In contrast, the control group did not show this effect
(t(29) = 1.39, p = 0.174; but the interaction of group 3 encoding
type did not reach significance), suggesting that the more
frequent presentation of specific choice options did not lead to
an increased preference by itself as one could predict based
on the ‘‘mere-exposure’’ literature (Kunst-Wilson and Zajonc,
1980). Next, we split decision trials (only for the memory group)
according to whether both, one, or none of the snacks were
correctly reported during cued recall (Figure 2E). Expectedly,
participants performed at chance level when they forgot both
snacks (paired t test against 50%: t(29) = 1.65, p = 0.110) and
decided worse when they forgot one snack compared to when
they remembered both (t(29) = 5.53, p < 0.001). We further exam-
ined those trials for which participants recalled only one of the
two snacks by splitting them according to whether the remem-
bered snack had the higher or lower BDM value (i.e., whether it
was the better or worse of the two offered snacks) (Figure 2F).
Consistent with a memory bias, participants selected the better
snack more often, if it was remembered than if it was forgotten
(t(29) = 4.93, p < 0.001). However, choice accuracy was still above
chance level, when only the worse item was recalled (t(29) = 4.04,
p < 0.001). Together, the results show that when one snack was
forgotten, participants were biased toward choosing the remem-
bered snack but did not select it in all instances. Instead, they
seemed to compare the recalled snack to a reference value
and rejected the snack, if its value was below this reference.
To substantiate this conclusion, we z-transformed the BDM
values within each participant and tested how often the remem-
bered snack was chosen depending on its (z-transformed) value
(Figure 2G). The rationale of the z-transform is that it can conve-
niently illustrate a memory bias: participants should be indif-
ferent between the remembered and the forgotten snack, if the
remembered snack has an average value (i.e., z-transformed
value = 0). For each participant, we estimated a logistic regres-
sion model of the type:
y =
eb0 +b1x
1+ eb0 +b1x
; (Equation 1)
where y indicates whether the remembered snack was chosen
(y = 1) or rejected (y = 0) and x represents the z-transformed
BDM value of this snack. The crucial test for a memory bias on
choice is whether the parameter b0, which shifts the logistic
function to the left or right, is significantly different from 0.Indeed, b0 was significantly higher than 0 (0.60 ± 0.83; t(29) =
3.93, p < 0.001), consistent with a bias toward remembered
snacks. The control group did not exhibit such a bias (Fig-
ure S1A). These choice patterns are in line with the assumption
that remembered options are compared to a reference value
(which is lower than the mean value of all snacks), if the alterna-
tive option is forgotten. Note, however, that the analysis is based
on a small number of trials. Furthermore, it relies on the cued
recall performance that might not exactly reflect the memory
state in the decision phase (the correlation between choice
accuracy and cued recall accuracy was significant but moder-
ate: r(29) = 0.36; p = 0.049). Thus, a more systematic approach
is to model decisions themselves for deriving the parameters
that underlie preferential choices from memory.
Developing and Testing a Choice Model
Participants showed a complex pattern of choice behavior
depending on the available decision time and on their memory
of the choice options. Choices were more accurate when they
had more time to decide, but performance was constrained
by the mnemonic demands of the task and thus improved
by lowering these demands (i.e., for snacks encoded 23).
Forgotten snacks were rejected more often, but not if the
remembered alternative was very unattractive.
Based on this pattern, we developed a computational process
model of memory-guided preferential choice (Figures 3A and
3B) and estimated its parameters using Bayesian cognitive
modeling (Figure 3C and Table 1) (Lee and Wagenmakers, 2014)
(seealsoSupplementalExperimentalProcedures fordetails about
model and parameter estimation). Essentially, the model predicts
the probability with which one of the two options is chosen by
a Wiener diffusion process with drift (Luce, 1986; Ratcliff, 1978).
This drift is governed by a DV that is related to (1) the BDM
values of the two options, (2) the probability that the options are
successfully remembered, and (3) the memory bias that comes
into play when one option has been forgotten. Since participants
are forced to decide after a predetermined amount of time, the
choice probability depends on the expected position of the DV
at the timepoint of the decision (Figure 3A). Importantly, themodel
predicts more accurate decisions with longer decision time.
Essentially, the model incorporates four free parameters to
describe the various behavioral patterns: (1) s, the standard
deviation of the DV that models the degree of randomness
in the choice behavior; (2) a, the probability of remembering a
snack that was encoded only 13; (3) b, the improvement of
memory for snacks encoded 23; and (4) g, the memory bias
that quantifies the degree to which a remembered snack is
preferred over a forgotten snack (negative values indicate a
bias toward remembered snacks). To fit the model to the data,
we employed a hierarchical Bayesian modeling approach allow-
ing us to assume that individual parameters are drawn from
Gaussian group distributions. Besides general advantages of
this method (e.g., with handling outliers), it enabled us to esti-
mate the different parameters of the memory and the control
group in a combined fashion: as participants of the control group
did not have to recall the choice options from memory, we fixed
all their parameters that were linked to the mnemonic nature of
our task (a = 1, b = 0, g = 0). On the other hand, we assumedNeuron 86, 1078–1090, May 20, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 1081
Figure 3. Cognitive Model of Preferential Choices from Memory
(A) Drift diffusion process. Depicted are the average DVs of two decisions for which Vleft is slightly (light gray) or substantially (dark gray) higher than Vright. Since
participants were forced to wait for either 1 s or 5 s before responding, the model predicts the probability q of choosing the left option by the area under each
normal distribution from 0 toN.
(B) Graphical model of the hierarchical Bayesian modeling approach. Squares/circles refer to discrete/continuous variables; gray/white nodes refer to known/
unknown variables; double-bordered nodes refer to (unknown) variables that are not sampled but fully determined by other variables. s, a, b, g are the free
parameters of each participant sampled from normal distributions with group means ms, a, b, g and precisions ls, a, b, g. The gray background indicates which
variables were estimated for the memory group only.
(C) Prior (lines) and posterior (bars) probability distributions for the group means of parameters s, a, b, g. See also Figures S2–S4.that the parameter s, which is linked to decision making in
general, is drawn from a joint distribution coming from both
groups (see also Supplemental Experimental Procedures for a
comparison with Maximum Likelihood Estimation).
The estimation of the model requires defining prior distribu-
tions for the group parameters. A Markov chain Monte Carlo1082 Neuron 86, 1078–1090, May 20, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.(MCMC) algorithm then samples from these priors to empirically
derive posterior distributions given the data and the model
(Figure 3C; see also Figure S2). The critical test for our model
is whether there is evidence that the posterior group means of
the free parameters are different from values that would render
these parameters irrelevant. For example, if the posterior group
Table 1. Posterior Estimates of Model Parameters
Parameter Meaning Mean (SD) Bayes Factor
s Standard deviation of drift rate memory group: 2.39 (1.02),
control group: 2.32 (1.10)a
BF(s > 0): 79.84, BF(s < 10):N
a Probability of remembering snacks shown 13 0.46 (0.04) BF(a > 0): 199.60, BF(a < 1): 19.96
b Increase in probability (a) for snacks shown 23 0.22 (0.01) BF(b > 0): 2.63, BF(b < 1):N
g Reference value when one snack is forgotten 0.82 (0.03) BF(g < 0): 4.87, BF(g > 2): 2.94
d Decision threshold (only for Study 2) 4.74 (1.17) BF(d > 0):N, BF(d < 10):N
aMemory and control group do not differ from each other with respect to s (t(58) = 0.24, p = 0.809).mean of the memory-related parameter awas 1, this would sug-
gest that participants had remembered all snacks—thus
rendering a itself irrelevant. Practically, the relevance of a param-
eter is given by the Bayes Factor (BF) between the complex
model that contains a as a free parameter and the restricted
model without the parameter a (i.e., a = 1), which can be approx-
imated by the Savage-Dickey density ratio (i.e., the ratio of the
prior and posterior distributions at a = 1) (Kass and Raftery,
1995; Lee and Wagenmakers, 2014). As shown in Table 1, the
BFs for all parameters provide evidence for the more complex
models, illustrating that the parameters captured relevant pat-
terns in the choice behavior. The BFs range from 2.63 to N;
BFs between 1 and 3 has been asserted to provide weak evi-
dence, between 3 and 10moderate, between 10 and 100 strong,
and a BF beyond 100 decisive evidence (Jeffreys, 1961). Thus, in
most cases there is at least moderate evidence in favor of the
proposed model. Moreover, the model is able to reproduce the
choice accuracy rates for the different conditions and groups
(Figure S3). We also tested a more complex model that allows
for decay or self-excitation of theDV (i.e., anOrnstein-Uhlenbeck
model) but did not find support for it (Figure S4).
Behavioral Study with Free Responses
The developed SSM predicts the finding that choice accuracy
increased with decision time. However, even though normative
economic choice models do not take decision time into account,
they could be adapted easily—for instance, by linking decision
time to the error function of random utility models (cf. Loomes
and Sugden, 1995). Hence, we sought to provide further support
for our SSM by an additional behavioral experiment with 17 new
participants who completed the same task as the memory group
but were free to respond at any time (up to a limit of 5 s) instead
of being forced to wait a predetermined amount of time. The
goals of this study were (1) to replicate the main behavioral find-
ings of the fMRImemory group, (2) to replicate themodel’s ability
to predict choice accuracies under different conditions, and (3)
to show that the model captures the response time (RT) distri-
butions of correct and incorrect decisions.
In line with the results from the fMRI memory group, partici-
pants of the newstudyweremore accuratewhenboth choice op-
tions were encoded 23 compared to 13 (t(16) = 2.56, p = 0.021)
(Figure 4A). Furthermore, participants exhibited the same mem-
ory bias on choices; that is, they were more likely to prefer a
rememberedover a forgottenoption (averageb0 [seeEquation 1]:
0.67 ± 6.5; t(16) = 4.28, p < 0.001) (Figure S1). Hence, the core
behavioral findings of the fMRI experiment could be replicated.With respect to modeling, we adapted the model to allow
predicting RTs (see Supplemental Experimental Procedures).
Specifically, SSM account for RT distributions by assuming
that the sampling process stops as soon as a decision threshold
is crossed (Smith and Ratcliff, 2004). Hence, we introduced
a decision threshold parameter d, which was allowed to vary be-
tween participants. With the exception of this threshold, we did
not fit the parameters of themodel to the data to provide a strong
generalization test of the model (Busemeyer and Wang, 2000).
Instead we used the mean estimated parameters of the model
from the memory group of Study 1 (i.e., s, a, b, g; see Table 1)
to predict the data in Study 2. Only the (new) decision threshold
was estimated using the hierarchical Bayesian approach (see
Figure 4B and Table 1). Despite the restrictions of the model,
we found that it predicted accuracy rates and RT distributions
of correct and incorrect decisions with remarkable precision
(Figures 4A and 4C).
fMRI Results: Subsequent Memory
When people encode information into long-term memory, acti-
vation of the hippocampus (HC) is higher when this information
can be successfully retrieved later on compared to when it is
lost (Kim, 2011; Paller and Wagner, 2002). Usually, this subse-
quent memory (SM) effect is based on performance in a memory
retrieval task following the encoding phase at some point. With
respect to our paradigm, we tested whether memory-related
activation during encoding can also be inferred from choice
behavior (and our computational model). To this end, we used
Bayes’ rule to estimate the posterior probability, denoted as
Posteriorx, that a snack x was successfully remembered in the
decision phase. Intuitively, Posteriorx is high for chosen snacks
of high value and for rejected snacks of low value (see Supple-
mental Experimental Procedures and Figure S5 for derivations
and examples). Posteriorx was implemented as a regressor in
the fMRI analysis of the encoding phase. We found this variable
to be significantly correlated with blood-oxygen-level-depen-
dent (BOLD) signals in the right anterior HC, while the left anterior
HC activation did not reach significance (Figure 5A and Table
S1). Activity in the right HC remained significant after controlling
for the traditional SM effect (i.e., memory performance in the
cued recall task). A comparison of model-based and traditional
SM effects revealed that the model-based SM effect better
accounted for the signal in right HC, and the traditional SM effect
better explained left HC activation (Figure 5B), as qualified by a
significant interaction effect of hemisphere 3 SM type on the
signal averaged for anatomical regions of interests (ROIs) ofNeuron 86, 1078–1090, May 20, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 1083
Figure 4. Modeling Results of the Free Response Task
(A) Empirical and predicted accuracy rates for the two encoding conditions in
the additional behavioral experiment in which participants were allowed to
respond at any time.
(B) Prior and posterior probability distributions for the group mean of the
threshold parameter d.
(C) Empirical (bars) and predicted (lines) RT distributions of correct and
incorrect choices. Despite having only one free parameter (i.e., d), the model
1084 Neuron 86, 1078–1090, May 20, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.left and right HC (F(1,29) = 4.56, p = 0.041). Note that the intra-in-
dividual correlation of model-based and traditional SM regres-
sors was significant but rather low (r = 0.17, ± 0.09; t(29) =
10.04, p < 0.001), which is consistent with the moderate correla-
tion of choice accuracy and cued recall accuracy (see above)
and suggests that partially distinct memory mechanisms were
required in the two different tasks.fMRI Results: Value Representations during Encoding
and Decisions
A great deal of neuroimaging studies suggest that the ventrome-
dial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and the ventral striatum (VS)
represent the subjective value of objects during decision making
and other tasks (Bartra et al., 2013; Clithero and Rangel, 2014).
Consistently, the vmPFC and left VS signals were significantly
correlated with the BDM value of the presented snack during
encoding (the right VS signal did not survive small-volume
correction) (Figure 6A and Table S1).
With respect to decision making, the BOLD signal in vmPFC
(and possibly VS as well) has been asserted to represent the
value of the chosen option (Wunderlich et al., 2012), chosen
and unchosen options (Hare et al., 2011), or the difference
between chosen and unchosen options (Boorman et al., 2009).
In our case, the question of which value is represented in
vmPFC/VS is further complicated by the fact that an option x
was only remembered with some probability Posteriorx. There-
fore, we set up a series of analyses to determine how exactly
the values of chosen and unchosen options are represented,
and whether these values should be corrected by Posteriorx
(for details, see Supplemental Experimental Procedures). First,
we tested whether different combinations of the value of chosen
options (Vchosen) and unchosen options (Vunchosen) revealed sig-
nificant activation in vmPFC and VS using conventional General
Linear Model (GLM) fMRI analyses. We found that only Vchosen
and the sum of Vchosen and Vunchosen (with and without modula-
tion by Posteriorx) were correlated with the vmPFC/VS signals,
but not their difference (or absolute difference). Next, we used
a Bayesian model comparison approach for fMRI (Penny et al.,
2005; Stephan et al., 2009; see also Gluth et al., 2014) to identify
which of the remaining four regressors (Vchosen, Vchosen,modulated,
Vchosen + Vunchosen, Vchosen,modulated + Vunchosen,modulated) ex-
plained the vmPFC/VS signals best. There was moderate
evidence for Vchosen,modulated + Vunchosen,modulated being the
best predictor of the fMRI signal (the exceedance probabilities
representing the relative probabilities that the data were gener-
ated by one of the regressors were 2.3%, 32.7%, 19.9%, and
45.1%, respectively).
These results suggest that both chosen and unchosen value
signals (modulated by Posteriorx) are represented in vmPFC
and/or VS. To corroborate this, we conducted a new GLM with
separate regressors for Vchosen,modulated and Vunchosen,modulated.
Indeed, we found significant activation in vmPFC for both
Vchosen,modulated and Vunchosen,modulated (Figure 6B and Table S1).predicts RTs very accurately; the small underestimation of early (over-
estimation of late responses) might be due to the 5 s time limit. Error bars
represent 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 5. Model-Based and Traditional SM
Effects
(A)Posteriorx, the probability that an itemhad been
remembered in the decision phase, correlated
with fMRI signals in anterior HC during the
encoding phase.
(B) Right: HC activation was better accounted
for by Posteriorx (red); left: HC activation was
better accounted for by the traditional SM effect
(blue); bar plots show the average percentage of
signal change in anatomical ROIs of right and left
HC. Display threshold: p < 0.001 (uncorrected)
with 10 contiguous voxels. Error bars represent
95% confidence intervals. See also Figure S5 and
Table S1.Vchosen,modulated but not Vunchosen,modulated was also correlated
with activation in the right VS. As can be seen in Figure 6B, we
also obtained remarkably strong and bilateral HC signals linked
to Vchosen,modulated (but not Vunchosen,modulated). The effect re-
mained significant even after controlling formemory-related vari-
ables (i.e., Posteriorchosen, Posteriorchosen + Posteriorunchosen,
cued recall performance), which by themselves were not related
to HC activation in the decision phase. Taken together, these
results provide strong evidence that not only vmPFC and VS
but also HC represent the value of the chosen option in preferen-
tial choices from memory.
fMRI Results: Effective Connectivity between HC
and vmPFC
Given the distributed value representation in HC and vmPFC/VS
during decision making, we asked how these brain regions are
functionally coupled with each other to mediate memory-guided
choices. Furthermore, we tested whether the memory bias on
decisions also influences the HC-vmPFC coupling. To this
end, we employed dynamic causal modeling (DCM; Friston
et al., 2003) for inferring the most likely generative model of
effective connectivity that underlies our data. We concentrated
on the coupling between HC with vmPFC, because only vmPFC
but not VS signals for subjective value (during encoding) and
chosen value (during decisions) were overlapping and because
vmPFC also represented unchosen value. Moreover, as neither
HC nor vmPFC activations were correlated with the onset
regressor of the decision phase (only with parametric modula-
tions at that time), we introduced a third ROI in the visual cortex
(right middle occipital gyrus) that exhibited strong activation
during decisions (Figure 7A and Table S1) as input region for
the DCMs.
Figure 7B depicts the three ROIs (visual cortex, HC, vmPFC)
and their intrinsic connections together with the three drivingNeuron 86, 1078–10inputs (decision onset, chosen value,
unchosen value). Since we were inter-
ested in testing which coupling architec-
ture best describes the memory-guided
choice process, we specified 54 different
DCMs for all possible combinations of
intrinsic connections and driving inputs
(Table S2) and used Bayesian modelselection (BMS; Stephan et al., 2009) to obtain the most likely
DCM given the data (Figure 7B shows the most complex DCM
including all connections and inputs that we considered). The
model with the highest exceedance probability (Figure S6) only
included forward connections from the visual cortex to HC and
from HC to vmPFC as well as the decision onset and value
regressors as driving inputs for visual cortex and vmPFC (but
not HC), respectively (Figure 7C).
Finally, we askedwhether the connectivity model as awhole or
specific couplings are influenced by the memory bias on
choices. Therefore, we split trials based on whether—according
to our model—the better memorized option was chosen or re-
jected (i.e., whether Posteriorchosen > Posteriorunchosen or vice
versa). For both trial types, we again set up the 54 possible
DCMs and compared them by means of BMS. In both cases,
the best model was the same as for the comparison including
all trials (Figure S6), indicating that the general connectivity
architecture was similar. However, only when participants chose
the option with the higher posterior probability, the intrinsic
coupling from HC to vmPFC was significantly positive, and the
difference in HC-vmPFC coupling between the two trial types
was significant (t(29) = 2.90, p = 0.007) (Figure 7C; Table S3).
fMRI Results: Psycho-Physiological Interaction
The DCM analysis suggests HC and vmPFC to be coupled with
each other only when participants chose the better remembered
option. This finding leaves open which other brain regions
are connected to vmPFC during memory-guided decisions in
general and during trials in which the better remembered
option was not chosen in particular. To this end, we applied two
psycho-physiological interaction (PPI) analyses (Friston et al.,
1997) with the decision trial onsets of the two trial types from
the DCM analysis as psychological variables and the vmPFC as
seed region (see Supplemental Experimental Procedures).90, May 20, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 1085
Figure 6. Subjective Value Signals in Encoding and Decision Phases
(A) The BDM value of the encoded snack was linked to activation of vmPFC
and left VS.
(B) During decision making, value signals of the chosen snack (magenta) were
found in vmPFC and right VS but also in bilateral HC. Value signals of the
unchosen snack (cyan) were found in vmPFC only. Display threshold: p < 0.001
(uncorrected) with 10 contiguous voxels. See also Table S1.Using a conjunction analysis, we tested which areas are
connected to vmPFC during decision making in both trial types
and found signals in a network comprising anterior medial
PFC, posterior cingulate cortex, and angular gyrus (Figure S7A).1086 Neuron 86, 1078–1090, May 20, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.Notably, a strikingly similar activation pattern is reported in
studies on recognition memory, especially when contrasting
recollection against familiarity memory (Kim, 2010; Yonelinas
et al., 2005). Consistent with the DCM results, the PPI analysis
did not reveal the HC to be generally coupled with vmPFC but
only for Posteriorchosen > Posteriorunchosen trials (Figure S7B).
DISCUSSION
The present work investigates the impact of memory processes
on value-based decisions when the choice options are not
directly seen but have to be retrieved from memory. The behav-
ioral results are consistent with choice accuracy and RT predic-
tions of SSM but indicate that people are limited by memory
constraints and biased toward options that they remember
better. Our computational model helped quantifying this bias
and allowed inferring memory-related brain activation during
encoding (over and above the cued recall based SM effect).
At the time of making memory-guided decisions, HC encodes
the value of the chosen option together with VS and vmPFC,
while only vmPFC further encodes the value of the unchosen
option. Modeling effective connectivity during the choice pro-
cess indicates the HC to be coupled with vmPFC, which in turn
is more likely to generate choices on the basis of chosen and
unchosen value signals (Hunt et al., 2012). Finally, the strength
of this HC-vmPFC coupling was higher when people chose the
better remembered option and is therefore a direct neural marker
of memory bias on preferential choice.
Perhaps surprisingly, we found HC signals during the choice
process not to be correlated with memory-related variables.
Instead, HC activation represented the value of the chosen
option along with vmPFC and VS. It has been argued that the
HC (together with VS and vmPFC) belongs to an automatic brain
valuation system and is always activated in proportion to the
subjective value of currently perceived objects—independent
of any task demands (Lebreton et al., 2009). This view is not fully
in line with our results, as it would predict value-dependent acti-
vation of HC during encoding as well (for which we did not find
any evidence). Our findings rather indicate the representation
of chosen value in HC to be specific to memory-guided deci-
sions. The lack of any representation of the unchosen option’s
value together with the DCM and PPI results suggests that the
HC does not simply play a ‘‘neutral’’ role of informing the vmPFC
about the choice alternatives. Instead, it appears to bias the
choice process toward better remembered items. Given that
chosen value can also be a post-decision signal (but see Hunt
et al., 2012), an additional function of HC could be to encode
the value of the chosen options for facilitating later comparisons.
In this case, HCmight receive chosen value signals from regions
such as vmPFC or VS (though backward connections from
vmPFC to HC were not supported by the DCM analysis).
In a recent fMRI study, Wimmer and Shohamy (2012) provided
evidence for a critical role of HC in the biasing effect of associa-
tive memory on value-based choices. In this study, pictures of
faces, scenes, and body parts were associatedwith neutral stim-
uli, and some of these neutral stimuli were then conditioned with
monetary reward. Finally, the authors let participants choose
between the pictures. Similar to our findings, they proposed an
Figure 7. Effective Connectivity in Preferen-
tial Choices from Memory
(A) A region in the right middle occipital gyrus,
showing strong activation during decision making,
served as input region for the DCM analysis.
Display threshold: p < 0.05 (whole-brain FWE
corrected).
(B) Illustration of the ROIs, intrinsic connections,
and driving inputs; the DCM as shown here rep-
resents the full model including all possible con-
nections and inputs.
(C) Left: the most likely DCM (according to BMS)
with connection strengths for the DCM including
all trials (‘‘(+)’’ = positive but not significant; ‘‘+’’ =
positive at p < 0.05; ‘‘++’’ = positive at p < 0.01;
‘‘+++’’ = positive at p < 0.001); right: the connec-
tion from HC to vmPFC (circled) was only signifi-
cantly positive when participants chose the better
remembered snack. Error bars represent 95%
confidence intervals. See also Figures S6 and S7
and Tables S1–S3.increased connectivity between memory (HC) and reward/deci-
sion-making (caudate nucleus) areas in the brain to mediate a
memory bias on choice. There are, however, essential differ-
ences between this study and ours: Wimmer and Shohamy
investigated the impact of implicit memory association on
choices, and people were unable to report the associations
between pictures and conditioned stimuli. In contrast, we ad-
dressed the question of how explicit memories guide (and
bias) value-based decisions. Moreover, the previous work
focused on neural activity and connectivity during conditioning,
while we looked at the coupling of HC and vmPFC when people
were making decisions. Yet, the two studies provide emerging
evidence that implicit and explicit memories bias preferential
choices through elevated connectivity between HC and
choice-related brain structures.
Why are people driven toward choice options that they
remember better? One explanation is that people pay more
attention to these options while making decisions. As soon as
a past experience from a restaurant visit is recalled, for instance,
one’s attention is automatically drawn to that restaurant as a po-
tential candidate. It has recently been established that options
that receivemore attention aremore likely to be chosen (Krajbich
et al., 2010). A second but not mutually exclusive explanation is
that (better) remembered options can be seen as safer options
(‘‘at least I know what I get’’) and taking a forgotten alternative
can be regarded as a risky decision. In other words, the param-
eter g of our cognitive model, which replaces the value of a
forgotten option and is well below average value, resembles
the certainty equivalent in risky choice: only if the certain (i.e.,
remembered) option is below this value, people take the riskNeuron 86, 1078–10of selecting the unknown alternative
(because they have sufficient certainty
that this alternative is probably better).
Future work could investigate whether
risk-sensitive brain regions, such as the
anterior insula (Mohr et al., 2010) are
also involved in memory-guided deci-sions, and whether more risk-averse people are biased more
strongly by their memories. A third explanation would be that
our participants had the (wrong) impression that they remem-
bered good options more often than bad options. If participants
believed that forgotten options are usually worse than remem-
bered ones, it would be rational for them to set the reference
value g below average.
The interplay of memory and decision making have been
investigated in two recent studies with fMRI (Kumaran et al.,
2009) and magnetoencephalography (MEG; Guitart-Masip
et al., 2013), respectively. Kumaran and colleagues examined
how the acquisition of conceptual knowledge (e.g., associations
between shapes and locations) drives decision making and
found that the HC-vmPFC circuit is essential to successfully
learn and use such complex associations. Similarly, Guitart-
Masip and colleagues used a nonspatial, contextual reinforce-
ment learning task to target the synchronization of MEG signals
in medial temporal lobe (MTL) and PFC. Consistent with our re-
sults, these studies emphasize the central role of HC and vmPFC
(and their coupling) in guiding choices frommemory. Yet, our re-
sults deviate from this previous work in at least two important
ways. First, we found that during decision making HC does not
represent memory strength but the value of the chosen option.
In contrast, Guitart-Masip and colleagues report that MTL theta
power (4–8 Hz) and its synchronization with PFC theta were
independent of reward and expected value. Second, neither of
the two studies identified a memory-dependent choice bias
and associated it with the coupling between HC and vmPFC.
Our Bayesian modeling approach enabled us to infer for each
snack the posterior probability that it was successfully recalled90, May 20, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 1087
during decision making (Posteriorx). The validity of this technique
is corroborated by our finding that Posteriorxwas indeed associ-
ated with HC activation during encoding, a choice-model-based
variant of the SM effect. Together with the rather moderate cor-
relation of choice and cued recall performance, the apparent
lateralization of SM effects (left = traditional, right = model-
based) suggests different mnemonic demands of the two task:
being accurate in the choice task does not necessarily require
recalling the identity of the snacks (as in cued recall) but only
associating certain positions on the screen with higher and lower
values (‘‘I don’t remember what snack it was, but it was a good
one’’). Notably, patients with right temporal lobectomy are spe-
cifically impaired in the successful retrieval of locations (Smith
and Milner, 1981; Stepankova et al., 2004). On a methodological
level, our approach offers a principled way to capture trial-by-
trial variability in neuroimaging signals with Bayesian optimal ef-
ficiency. Also, our newly developed paradigm could be further
employed to investigate the specific role of memory in applied
research areas such as dietary choice.
In conclusion, we have shown that a sequential sampling
framework for preferential choices can be extended to mem-
ory-guided preferential decisions. This approach allows explain-
ing howmemory constraints can lead to specific memory effects
on decision making. The effective connectivity from HC to
vmPFC plays a central role in preferential choices from memory:
it underlies the choice process in general and at the same time it
mediates the tendency to select better memorized options.EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Participants
A total of 84 participants took part in the studies (34 in the fMRI memory group,
32 in the control group, 18 in Study 2 described in detail in the Supplemental
Experimental Procedures). Two participants of the memory group and two
participants of the control group were excluded because they responded
either too early or too late in more than 25% of the decision trials. In addition,
fMRI data of two participants of the memory group could not be analyzed
due to problems withMR scanning (triggering, artifacts). Thus, the final sample
of Study 1 comprised 30 participants in each group (memory group: mean
age = 26.1 years, ± 3.9, 18–37 years; 18 females; control group: mean age =
25.0 years, ± 4.1, 18–35 years; 19 females). The study was approved by a local
ethics committee (A¨rztekammer Hamburg) and all participants gave written
informed consent. Participants were reimbursed for participation (10 Euro
per hour) and could earn additional money and/or snacks based on the results
of the BDM auction and the main task (see below). Participants of the control
group and of Study 2 did not undergo fMRI.
Experimental Design
Participants were asked not to eat for 3 hr before coming to the study (they
rated their level of hunger at the beginning of the study on a scale from 1 =
‘‘not hungry at all’’ to 7 = ‘‘very hungry’’ with 4.23 on average). Upon arrival,
they were first shown all 48 snacks that were well-known products available
in German supermarkets. The snacks were grouped into six categories (chips,
chocolates, wine gums, salty snacks, chocolate bars, other snacks) of eight
items each. To facilitate communication during scanning, participants then
viewed one snack after the other on a computer screen and learned its asso-
ciated name (they were supposed to say these names during cued recall).
Afterward, participants were introduced to the BDM auction: they could bet
0 to 3 Euro on each snack using a continuous visual analog scale (VAS); at the
end of scanning, one of the BDM trials was selected randomly; also, a random
amount between 0 and 3 Euro was drawn; they received this amount, if it was
higher than their bid for the selected snack; otherwise, they received the1088 Neuron 86, 1078–1090, May 20, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.snack. The BDM auction was conducted twice (in differently randomized
order). In the first run, the green bar of the VAS always started at 1.5 Euros.
For the second run, it started at the corresponding bid from the first run,
thus allowing participants to reconsider their bets.
The choice sets of the main task depended on the results of the (second)
BDM auction. In pilot studies, we observed that participants had particularly
good memory for snacks with top BDM values. Therefore, we excluded the
best 6 snacks for the main task, since the focus of this study was the influence
of memory on choice (and not the influence of value on memory). From the re-
maining 42 snacks, we created 24 sets of 6 snacks each for the 24 runs of the
main task. Each 6-item set consisted of snacks from at least 3 categories (so
that decisions were always made between snacks from different categories).
Snacks were split into 3 value levels (low,medium, and high) and each set con-
tained 2 snacks from each level (so that values and choice difficulty was similar
across sets). Trials with snacks of equal BDM value were not included. During
the assignment of snacks to conditions (encoding 13 or 23 ; decision time 1 s
or 5 s), we ensured that choice difficulty was similar across conditions. Further-
more, we minimized the number of repetitions of snacks across runs (espe-
cially for consecutive runs) to avoid intrusions.
Following the BDMauction, participants conducted themain task while lying
in the MR scanner. Each of the 24 runs started with the encoding phase, in
which participants learned the association of 6 different snacks to 6 different
screen locations. Whereas snacks varied from run to run, locations stayed
the same. Each trial started with the arrangement of locations (white squares)
for a variable time period of 2–6 s. One location was then highlighted (red
square) for 1 s. Afterward, the snack was displayed at this square for 2 s. To
ensure that participants paid attention, they had to indicate whether the snack
was salty or sweet (by pressing buttons with the left index finger for ‘‘salty’’ or
with the right index finger for ‘‘sweet’’ on two MR button-boxes). 3 of the 6
snacks were shown 23 during encoding. These repeated encoding trials
were always the last 3 trials of each encoding phase (so that participants could
not anticipate which snacks would be shown only 13). The encoding phase
was followed by a two-back working memory task with 30 digits from 0 to 9.
Here, participants had to press another button of the right boxwith their middle
finger if the current digit matched the digit presented two steps before. Digits
were presented for 900 ms, followed by a 100 ms interval between digits. Par-
ticipants were told that incorrect decisions in the ‘‘salty-sweet’’ and the two-
back tasks would lower their chances to receive a snack after scanning (we
reduced the probability of receiving a snack by 3/10, if participants were
less than 70% accurate in the two-back task, and by 1/216 for every miss in
the ‘‘salty-sweet’’ task). The decision phase succeeded the two-back task,
also starting with a display of the 6 locations for 2–6 s. 2 out of 6 locations
were then highlighted for either 1 s or 5 s by filling the squares white (in
contrast, the control group saw the 2 snacks themselves). Participants were
not allowed to respond during this time window but waited until the accentu-
ation disappeared again; they had then 700 ms to make their choice between
the two snacks. A choice made too early or too late decreased the chances of
receiving a snack at the end of the experiment (if the randomly picked decision
trial was a miss, no snack was received). To decide between snacks, partici-
pants used their left and right index fingers (locations were arranged so that
one option was always more on the left). In each run, participants made 9 de-
cisions (216 decisions in total), and each snack was offered 3 times. In pilot
studies, we observed that choice accuracy slightly increased over these 9 tri-
als, possibly because participants had already remembered a snack at an
earlier presentation (e.g., if a snack is presented the third time, it might have
been successfully retrieved at the first and/or second time and now it is easier
to retrieve it again). This improvement was also observed in the fMRI memory
group (choice accuracy for snacks shown the first time: 69.6% ± 9.6%: the
second time: 71.8% ± 10.5%; the third time: 75.6% ± 8.8%; F(2,58) = 14.11,
p < 0.001). The problem could have been avoided by showing each snack
only once but this would have reduced the number of decision trials to 72
and would have precluded iterating the estimation of Posteriorx (see Supple-
mental Experimental Procedures). Instead, we ensured that two simulta-
neously offered snacks always had the same number of repetitions (in other
words, they were both shown 0, 1, or 2 times before) to match their chances
of being retrieved. The number of decisions between snacks that were both
shown 23 during encoding, both shown 13, or one shown 23 and the other
13 was equal. At the end of each run, MR scanning was paused and partici-
pants had to recall all 6 snacks: after the six locations were displayed for 2
s, one location was selected (in randomized order) and highlighted, and the
participant had to vocalize the associated snack to the experimenter via the
MR micro. In addition, participants indicated how well they remembered
each snack using a VAS from ‘‘very poor’’ to ‘‘very good.’’ Participants of the
control group did not vocalize the snacks but prompted 3-letter abbreviations
that they had learned at the beginning of the study.
Participants received their reward (moneyand/or snacks)whenexiting theMR
scanner. Before leaving the study, they rated each snack with respect to its fa-
miliarity anddistinctiveness and filled out a questionnaire assessing their prefer-
ences for different snack categories, potential strategies they used to recall the
snacks, and their bodyweight and height. Stimulus presentation and creation of
choice sets were realized using MATLAB and its toolbox Cogent 2000.
Cognitive Modeling
Details are provided in Supplemental Experimental Procedures.
fMRI Data Acquisition and Pre-Processing
Details are provided in Supplemental Experimental Procedures.
Statistical Analysis of fMRI Data
Conventional statistical analysis of fMRI data was based on theGLM approach
as implemented in SPM8. Since the MR scanner was paused at every cued
recall phase, the dataset of each participant was divided into 24 time series.
We collapsed these series to a single run per participant, as each run con-
tained only a few encoding and decision trials. Individual design matrices
included 12 onset vectors: two for the presentation of snacks shown 13 or
23 during encoding, two for left or right button presses during encoding,
one for the duration of the two-back task, one for button presses during the
two-back task, two for the presentation of choice options for 1 s or 5 s during
decision making, two for left or right button presses during decision making,
and two nuisance vectors for misses in encoding and decision trials, respec-
tively (note that we had to declare the last trial of every decision phase as a
miss, because MR scanning was paused immediately after, causing severe
misspecification of the hemodynamic response of this last trial). The design
matrix also included 24 session constants. Onset vectors were accompanied
by parametric modulators (PMs) that modeled the predicted change of the he-
modynamic response as a function of a variable of interest at the respective
time point: all GLMs included the snack’s BDM values and Posteriorx as
PMs for the encoding onsets. For the decision onsets, different implementa-
tions of chosen and unchosen value were used as PMs in multiple GLMs
to test which value signals represent activation in vmPFC and VS best (see
Supplemental Experimental Procedures). To test for the traditional SM effect
during encoding, we set up a new GLM to also include the cued recall memory
performance (correct = 1, incorrect = 0) for the encoding onsets (the stepwise
orthogonalization of PMs was deactivated to remove any shared variance). To
test for effects of memory-related variables during decision making, we ran
several GLMs that included Posteriorchosen, Posteriorchosen + Posteriorunchosen,
or the cued recall memory performance (number of remembered snacks = 0, 1,
or 2) as additional PM for the decision onsets. During estimation of GLMs, a
high-pass filter (at 0.005 Hz) and correction for temporal autocorrelation
were applied to the data (a custom-built algorithm was used to adjust filter
and autocorrelation to the fact that the 24 separate time series were collapsed
to a single run). Contrast images were created for all onset vectors and PMs.
At the group level, we used the flexible factorial design as implemented in
SPM8 to test for effects of associated PMs (e.g., the contrast images of
Posteriorx during presentation of snacks shown 13 and 23 were taken
together in a single group-level analysis). The statistical threshold for the imag-
ing results was set to p < 0.05, family-wise error rate (FWE) corrected for small
volume (SVC). For value-based brain regions, SVC was based on spheres
of 10 mm radius centered at peak voxels from previous studies (vmPFC:
x = –3, y = 42, z = –6; Chib et al., 2009; VS: ± 14, 10, –10; O’Doherty et al.,
2004). For the HC and visual cortex, SVC was based on anatomical masks
(left and right HC; left and right calcarine sulcus plus left and right inferior,
middle, and superior occipital gyrus) of the AAL brain atlas (Tzourio-Mazoyer
et al., 2002). Regions beyond those for which we had a priori hypotheseswere reported if they survived a threshold of p < 0.05, FWE corrected for whole
brain. Activations are depicted on an overlay of the mean structural T1 image
from all participants. Average beta estimates for HC (Figure 5B) were extracted
and converted into BOLD % signal change using the SPM toolbox rfxplot
(Gla¨scher, 2009).
Connectivity Analyses
Details are provided in Supplemental Experimental Procedures.
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
Supplemental Information includes Supplemental Experimental Procedures,
seven figures, three tables and can be found with this article online at http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2015.04.023.
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